Circles of Exile: A Response to Professor Forbath by Epps, Garrett
EPPS.DOC 12/03/01 9:29 AM
CIRCLES OF EXILE:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FORBATH
GARRETT EPPS†
There is a man who comes to consult me in my office at the Uni-
versity of Oregon, almost as a professional colleague might. We ami-
cably discuss constitutional theory for a while, and then he goes away.
He is a perfect gentleman and a fair debater when he is with me, but
he is a member of a local militia, and a few years ago he was con-
victed of trespassing on land belonging to the United States Forest
Service.1 When he came to trial, he explained that he was not tres-
passing, because the federal government had no right of ownership in
the land; that the act of Congress that retained these lands upon Ore-
gon’s admission to the Union was unconstitutional; and, further, that
the court had no power to try him, because Marbury v. Madison2 was
wrongly decided.3
I mention this acquaintance only because Professor Forbath’s es-
say4 reminded me that the land of constitutional exile, like Dante’s
Hell, has different circles, the outermost of which harbors this man.
(By “constitutional exile” I mean allegiance to a vision of the Consti-
tution which has passed out of favor among those with power to in-
Copyright © 2001 by Garrett Epps.
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon. This Essay is a response to William
E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001), presented at the Con-
stitution in Exile conference hosted by the Program in Public Law at Duke University School of
Law on October 5–7, 2000. I wish to thank Professor Christopher Schroeder, the Duke Univer-
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1. United States v. Medenbach, No. 96-30168, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13256, at *12 (9th
Cir. June 2, 1997).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the power of judicial review).
3. Medenbach, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13256, at *12 (holding that Medenbach’s “argu-
ment against the constitutionality of judicial review [was] meritless”).
4. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001).
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terpret the law—judges, politicians, lawyers, scholars, and others.)
Some circles of exile are more comfortable—think tanks, law school
faculties, and newspaper editorial boards. Governments in exile
formed in these inner circles very quickly can find themselves in
power, driving their foes into exile in turn. Other circles are drabber,
colder, and more sparsely populated—public-access cable television
talk shows and meetings of organizations like the Fully Instructed
Jury Association or the many “tax-protester” organizations that will
convince members, for a fee, that the income tax is unconstitutional.
Those who live in these outer circles of exile are usually children of
the constitutional diaspora, raised to yearn for an idealized constitu-
tional homeland they never actually have seen.
Professor Forbath’s eloquent summary of the tenets of New Deal
constitutionalism and its concept of “social citizenship” describes a
vision of society and of the Constitution that I always have found
compelling.5 Professor Forbath lays out the forgotten history of the
idea that citizenship, for the New Dealers, entailed more than passive
obligations and negative liberties; it included the right to democratic
control over economic institutions and to affirmative support from
the state in realizing one’s potential.6 For much of my adult life I
looked forward to the restoration that would sweep social citizen-
ship’s adherents in from the inner circles of exile to their birthright of
influence. Increasingly, however, I feel a kind of sympathy with my
militia acquaintance. We do not occupy the same circle of exile, but
for us both, the comforts of home seem more and more a distant
memory. My children and I recite a family formula—something like,
“If I forget thee, O Works Progress Administration, may my right
hand lose its cunning”—but I begin to despair that my children ever
will see Jerusalem.
To understand why that is—and why, important as it is, Professor
Forbath’s vision does not necessarily prophesy a return—I suggest
turning to the outermost corners of exile, to the last group of Ameri-
can reformers who were willing to declare that they stood not for the
proper interpretation of the Constitution but for its repudiation: the
radical wing of the abolitionist movement, the Garrisonian abolition-
ists.7 Studying abolitionism reveals that the real significance of dis-
5. Id. at 166.
6. Id. at 176–78.
7. HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY 327 (1998).
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putes over the Constitution’s meaning often lies not in what the two
sides disagree about, but in what they both take for granted. Aboli-
tionists rejected the Constitution, to begin with, because it implicitly
sanctioned slavery.8 But many radical abolitionists were also, at least
at first, radical pacifists. They rejected the very idea of a nation-state
on the grounds that its existence and maintenance required complic-
ity in violence.9 The Constitution existed to form and protect a nation;
the nation could not exist without the means and willingness to de-
fend itself against other nations. Citizenship, in this analysis, meant
accepting the ill-gotten benefits of this violent appropriation of the
earth for the benefit of a few. Truly then, the Constitution was for the
radical abolitionists “a covenant with death.”10 I mention the Garriso-
nian abolitionists not because I also wish to repudiate the Constitu-
tion. Like most Americans (and of course like my acquaintance who
believes that we took a wrong turn at Marbury), I am not only loyal
to the Constitution, but also unshakably convinced that my vision of
its meaning embodies the True Faith. The story of the abolitionists
serves to remind us that our intense arguments about what the docu-
ment includes can blind us to what—or to whom—it excludes.
It is, as Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote, “a constitution we
are expounding,”11 and because of that, it is a nation we are consti-
tuting. Nations used to be defined geographically, with those inside
the borders sharing the burdens and benefits of membership and
those outside excluded. Today, however, nationhood has become in-
dependent of geography.
There exists now within our borders a substantial number of
people who explicitly and by law possess fewer legal rights than eve-
ryone else.12 This is not an unprecedented state of affairs—though one
can argue that slavery is the only analogous American precedent. The
potential corrosive effects of this population’s legal status on our no-
tions of citizenship and equality are so huge that, like all transcendent
social phenomena, they require an effort of will to see.
The population I am talking about consists of immigrants who
have entered the country without legal permission or who have re-
8. Id.
9. This part of radical abolitionism is ably documented in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 14, 18 (Staughton Lynd & Alice Lynd eds., rev. ed. 1995).
10. MAYER, supra note 7, at 313.
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
12. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (establishing procedures for the
apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens).
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mained after their permission has expired. Just as we forget the more
extensive definition of citizenship that lies behind the New Deal, we
also forget that the very concept of an “illegal alien” is a creature of
the twentieth century and that it did not appear in law until the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century.13
The term was relatively insignificant until 1965.14 The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service was a kind of social service agency;
now it is the largest law enforcement agency in the country.15 Illegal
status used to be temporary; now it is often lifelong. (In 1993, then-
California Governor Pete Wilson and the Federation for American
Immigration Reform even proposed amending the Fourteenth
Amendment to make illegal status hereditary.)16 Increasingly, an ille-
gal alien has, to coin a phrase, no rights that a citizen is bound to re-
spect.
The existence of this population of legally subhuman workers
renders problematic any attempt to define the rights of labor in a
broader way. Employers who do not wish to pay prevailing wages can
parcel out much of their work to illegal aliens, a population that is
easy to control. Further, capital in the emerging world order can flow
freely across borders. That means employers can thwart any attempt
by the government to mandate the kinds of social benefits that un-
derlay the New Deal concept of citizenship simply by threatening to
13. Fred Shapiro, librarian at Yale Law School and editor of the OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS (1993), dates the expression to 1947. E-mail from Fred Sha-
piro to Garrett Epps, Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
14. From 1942 until 1965, several million Mexicans were allowed to work as farmworkers
in the United States. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
954 (2d ed. 1997). This official program ended in 1965. Id. That same year, Congress revamped
U.S. immigration law and abolished the previous exemption from numerical restrictions on im-
migration from other countries in the Western Hemisphere, with the exceptions of immediate
relatives of American citizens and certain “special immigrants.” Immigration and Nationality
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(a), 79 Stat. 911, 911 (1965) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1151
(1994)); LEGOMSKY, supra, at 106. United States growers, who had become reliant on Mexican
labor, responded by hiring illegal immigrants in place of the formerly legal Mexicans. Id. at 954.
In short, Congress gave birth to the illegal alien problem.
15. Garrett Epps, Immigration Service’s Boot Is on Our Foot, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.),
Dec. 19, 1999, at E1.
16. Vlae Kershner, Wilson’s Plan to Curb Illegal Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1993,
at A1. In addition, the George W. Bush administration has proposed amnesty for many un-
documented immigrants of Mexican origin; this policy initiative immediately set off a fierce pro-
test by other immigrant groups who have been excluded. Eric Schmitt, Bush Aides Weigh Le-
galizing Status of Mexicans in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at A1; Eric Schmitt, Other
Immigrants, Envying Mexicans, Demand a Break, Too, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at A1.
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move the jobs abroad. In physical terms, immigration flow is nearly as
free as capital flow. However, the flow of capital is open and legally
protected; the flow of labor exists in a twilight world beneath law’s
notice and protection, depressing demands for a new definition of so-
cial citizenship.17 Reforms increasing the expectations of one coun-
try’s residents for social support can be expected to attract immigra-
tion inflows while producing simultaneous capital outflows, which
together reduce the amount of work for citizens and noncitizens
alike.18
Professor Forbath’s essay details some of the effects of domestic
legal inequality in the New Deal era, most particularly the Jim Crow
system.19 But the New Deal idea of citizenship had an international
component as well.20 Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms”21 are the antece-
dents of today’s increasingly formalized guarantees of international
human rights. Many New Dealers understood freedom from hunger
as a serious part of those freedoms. In fact, Henry Wallace once
mused that the Second World War would not be won until “every-
body in the world has the privilege of drinking a quart of milk a
day.”22 But the social citizenship aspect of international human rights
and governance has been thwarted as surely as was the domestic as-
pect. Consider that the United Nations—created largely to embody
New Deal notions of world citizenship—progressively has been
weakened and increasingly is supplanted as a multilateral lawmaker
by the World Trade Organization.23 Consider that human rights dis-
course, valuable as it is, more and more tends to ignore the social, or
17. G.M. Tamás, On Post-Fascism, BOSTON REV., Summer 2000, at 42, 46.
18. Id.
19. Forbath, supra note 4, at 203–09.
20. FRANK DONOVAN, MR. ROOSEVELT’S FOUR FREEDOMS: THE STORY BEHIND THE
UNITED NATIONS 23 (1966).
21. See id. at 25 (listing the “Four Freedoms” as freedom of speech and expression, free-
dom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear).
22. HENRY A. WALLACE, DEMOCRACY REBORN 193 (1944).
23. See Daniel Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 478, 487 (2000):
Judged against its initial mandate to reduce tariffs and otherwise liberalize world
trade, the [World Trade Organization] WTO (and its predecessor, the [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] GATT) has arguably been the most successful of
the international organizations established at the close of World War II. This very
success has attracted more and more issues into the WTO’s orbit, including competi-
tion policy.
EPPS.DOC 12/03/01 9:29 AM
470 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:465
positive, aspects of its founding documents24 in order to concentrate
on the purely legal or negative aspects. It is certainly exhilarating that
more and more nations and tribunals recognize an international right
not to be tortured. But the drafters of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights25 and the Covenants26 hoped that there also would be
recognition of corresponding rights to food, shelter, education, and
meaningful participation in the economy. The texts guaranteeing
those rights seldom are cited these days.
Internationally, then, we, like the states of the Union in the era
of Hammer v. Dagenhart,27 may find ourselves engaged in a race to
the bottom. And the race covers more ground, because the emerging
international order legalizes the mobility of capital without legalizing
the mobility of labor. As the Hungarian philosopher G.M. Tamás
wrote recently, this is not the first but the second regime of globaliza-
tion.28 The first ended with the First World War; in that regime, work-
ers were legally as free to move as were jobs.29 Now the migrations
continue, but the laws embody a vision of citizenship that covers
fewer and fewer of the people within a nation’s borders.30 The re-
sult—the slow dismantling of the idea of universal citizenship and the
inevitable reconnection of citizenship with a specific racial or ethnic
background—Tamás labels “post-fascism.”31
The phenomenon is most visible in the new “democracies” of the
former Soviet bloc, but we fight the same battle here.32 Until we cre-
ate a constitutional doctrine more protective of the people who have
come here as labor inputs, we cannot expect to make progress toward
broader rights of participation and economic security than the fairly
24. These “positive” rights are most comprehensively set out in the International Covenant
of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976), which the United States has yet to ratify.
25. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., U.N., YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL EDITION
U.N. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY, 1945–1995, at 303 (1995).
26. Id. at 306 (referencing the U.N. Covenants on Human Rights).
27. 247 U.S. 251, 269–77 (1918) (invalidating a federal law that prohibited the interstate
shipment of goods manufactured by child labor).
28. Tamás, supra note 17, at 42, 45–46.
29. Id. at 46.
30. Id.
31. Id. (characterizing the modern capitalist state as having adopted the post-fascist strat-
egy through its revival of class politics).
32. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 15, at E1 (detailing how the policies of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service resulted in a teenaged immigrant girl being jailed for seven months de-
spite a grant of asylum).
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minimal consumer rights we enjoy today. And just as the problems of
child labor and worker safety could not be cured by changing state
constitutions, we also must recognize that the United States Constitu-
tion no longer (if it ever did) describes a largely self-contained polity,
but that instead it is only one localized aspect of the broader struggle
to establish a meaningful concept of world citizenship, of a world in
which no one will feel the sting of exile and legal inequality. For this
reason, one of the most important tasks facing constitutional scholars
is that of defining more clearly—in ways that even, say, Supreme
Court Justices can understand—the ways in which our domestic Con-
stitution exists within a larger and increasingly more vital legal tradi-
tion of international institutions and legal norms.
It is in taking the first steps in that direction that we find our-
selves marching in tandem with those early abolitionists. We must re-
alize that today, one hundred and fifty years later, we still are wan-
dering in the wilderness, not much closer to the promised land.
